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International investment, and cooperation to facilitate it, can be critical in the fight against 
inequality and poverty. Cross-border investment activities by MNEs could establish operations 
and channel capital and technology to areas where it is badly needed, spurring economic growth, 
job creation, and higher wages. To the extent that IIAs catalyze cross-border investment activity, 
increasing the pay of low income workers, or increasing the tax revenue that can be used to 
redistribute wealth, they could help combat intra-national inequality.  
 
However, the more than 3,000 international investment agreements (IIAs) that govern foreign 
investment, and the investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) mechanism they contain instead 
entrench and exacerbate intra-national inequality. They do so in at least two ways. First, they 
provide covered multinational enterprises (MNEs) greater procedural power than other private 
individuals and entities under international and domestic law, both with respect to relations with 
the host state government, and in connection with disputes with other private parties. Second, 
compounding these privileged procedural rights, IIAs also provide those MNEs enhanced 
substantive standards of protection that strengthen the legal force of their economic rights and 
“expectations,” with potentially negative impacts on competing rights and interests held by others. 
 
IIAs and Unequal Procedural Rights for MNEs  
 
Designed to increase investment flows by protecting foreign investors from political risk, IIAs 
typically: (1) prohibit host states from discriminating against MNEs; (2) require host states to 
provide MNEs “fair and equitable” treatment; (3) require governments to pay prompt, adequate 
and effective compensation for MNEs or MNEs’ assets that they expropriate; and, (4) prevent host 
states from restricting MNEs’ abilities to transfer capital in and out of the country.   
 
Most IIAs give MNEs the extraordinary power to bring ISDS claims against host states to 
challenge, and seek monetary and other awards for, government conduct that breaches the IIAs’ 
provisions. This ability to bypass domestic courts and to sue governments directly through 
supranational systems is exceptional. For one, it represents a fundamental departure from 
traditional practice under international law. Under most international treaties, only states have had 
the power to enforce other states’ international law obligations.3 The international human rights 
legal framework notably departs from this trend. It allows non-state actors to challenge state 
conduct, but also requires those seeking to challenge government conduct to first exhaustively seek 
relief through domestic legal systems before bringing claims through international bodies.  
 
The ability of MNEs to initiate ISDS proceedings is similarly exceptional as compared to the 
ability of private individuals and entities to challenge government conduct under many domestic 
legal systems. Domestic jurisdictions typically employ various doctrines that both permit and 
restrict government exposure to litigation and liability for different types of conduct. They balance 
myriad policy considerations relating to diverse objectives (e.g., compensating victims, deterring 
future wrongful conduct, penalizing wrongdoers, and appropriately safeguarding government 
																																																						
3 The international human rights legal framework relevantly departs from this trend, but includes a requirement that 
those seeking to challenge government conduct first exhaustively pursue relief through the domestic legal system 
before bring claims through international bodies. 
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power and resources), reflected in rules and doctrines about who can bring claims, for what kind 
of harms, with what impact on third parties or future government conduct, what available remedies, 
etc… IIAs, however, allow MNEs to bypass such domestic legal restrictions by bringing their 
claims through the ISDS system, in which such domestic procedural rules do not apply. Giving 
MNEs access to ISDS and the ability to sidestep domestic rules when those rules are adverse to 
them, and avoid restraints on litigation otherwise applicable to all, gives MNEs greater power than 
non-MNEs to challenge government action and inaction. Even before an ISDS claim is filed or 
ISDS decision reached, the mere fact that only MNEs can sue through  ISDS can potentially cause 
the government to devote greater attention and accord greater deference to the preferences and 
interests of MNEs than the government otherwise would; in some cases, this heightened attention 
might be to the detriment of competing preferences and interests.4 
 
Take, for example, a situation in which the interests of stakeholder groups diverge. If, for instance, 
a government decision to issue a permit would be opposed by environmentalists, and a decision to 
deny the permit would be opposed by an MNE, the agency responsible for deciding which option 
to pursue may be influenced by knowledge that the environmentalists could not mount a lawsuit 
challenging the government’s decision but that the MNE could sue the government for vast sums 
through ISDS. This additional relief mechanism would likely influence the resulting persuasive 
power of the competing groups.  
 
In addition to giving MNEs greater power than non-MNEs vis-à-vis the government, ISDS also 
gives MNEs greater power than non-MNEs in legal disputes directly between those two groups. 
Assume, for example, that a domestic citizen successfully sues an MNE in host country courts for 
harms caused by the MNE, and is awarded monetary compensation for injuries suffered. The MNE 
may then be able to turn to ISDS to seek to undo or otherwise eliminate the effects of its court loss. 
In contrast, if the MNE were to have prevailed in the domestic court proceedings, the domestic 
citizen would have no similar power to seek a different outcome through ISDS. With access to 
ISDS, MNEs thus have greater opportunities to get their desired results than their non-MNE 
opponents do. 
 
Investors’ use of that procedural mechanism to get one more “bite at the apple” may create or 
exacerbate inequalities between, on the one hand, MNEs and their shareholders and, on the other 
hand, all other stakeholders without access to ISDS. Investors have used ISDS to contest decisions 
regarding damages for environmental harm, 5  the relative rights of creditors and debtors in 
bankruptcy proceedings, 6
 
contests over land ownership, 7
 
citizen suits challenging permitting 
decisions for extractive industry operations,8 the legitimacy of intellectual property protections in 
the manufacture of generic pharmaceuticals,9
 
and other unfavorable litigation proceedings and 
																																																						
4 G. Van Harten and D. N. Scott, “Investment Treaties and the Internal Vetting of Regulatory Proposals: A Case 
Study from Canada (Part 2),” in Lisa Sachs and Lise Johnson (eds), Yearbook on International Investment Law and 
Policy 2015-2016 (Oxford University Press 2018).  
5 See, e.g., Chevron Corp. v. Ecuador, Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2009-23.  
6 See, e.g., Dan Cake v. Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/12/9, Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability, August 24, 
2015. 
7 See, e.g., Awdi v. Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/10/13, Award, March 2, 2015 
8 See, e.g., Infinito Gold v. Costa Rica, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/5, Request for Arbitration, February 6, 2014, and 
Petition for Amicus Curiae Status, September 15, 2014. 
9 See, e.g., Eli Lilly v. Canada, ICSID Case No. ARB/14/2.  
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outcomes between the MNEs and other private individuals and entities before domestic courts. 
This disparity in legal power between MNEs with access to supranational ISDS mechanisms to 
advance their economic rights and interests and other stakeholders without such access can shift 
the outcomes in discrete cases, and may even shift broader contours of the law in favor of MNEs 
and away from other stakeholders, diffuse public interests and non-economic interests.  
 
IIAs and Unequal Substantive Rights for MNEs  
 
Beyond the privileged procedural rights that IIAs give to MNEs, enhanced substantive protections 
included in IIAs further empower MNEs and limit the ability of governments to act in the interests 
of other stakeholders. Particularly because property rights are a zero-sum game, in which 
“protecting the resource claims of some parties requires preventing others from using those same 
resources,”10 decisions on their definition and scope are a product of a rich history and ongoing 
contestation.11 Distributions of economic, social, and political power shape property rights; and, 
in turn, property rights can shape those distributions of power.12  
 
Traditionally, international law has left domestic jurisdictions—and the social forces, political 
processes, and legal institutions within them—significant latitude to define the scope of property 
rights and to allocate them among members of society.13 IIAs, however, have changed that. For 
instance, rather than merely protecting property rights as defined and redefined through domestic 
processes, IIAs—and, in particular, their “fair and equitable treatment” (FET) obligations as 
interpreted and enforced by ISDS14—have effectively become tools for creating new property 
rights to be enjoyed by MNEs. Specifically, arbitral tribunals interpreting and applying IIAs have 
created a legal doctrine through which they protect certain expectations held by foreign investors 
regarding future government treatment, and order host states to pay compensation if government 
conduct deviates from those expectations. Arbitral tribunals thereby effectively convert mere 
expectations regarding treatment of foreign-owned firms into legally recognized rights enforceable 
against the state.  
 
Additionally, ISDS decisions are determining the line between permissible laws, regulations and 
judicial decisions, and arbitrary, disproportionate or other interferences with economic interests 
that require compensation for lost future profits or other economic “harms”;15 in many cases, 
tribunals are drawing those lines differently than domestic legal systems have – even those with 
strong systems of property rights protections.16 
 
																																																						
10 T. Lawson-Remer, “Property Insecurity,” 38 Brooklyn Journal of International Law 145, 151 (2012). 
11 D. Kennedy, “Some Caution about Property Rights as a Recipe for Economic Development,” 1 Accounting, 
Economics, and Law 1, 10, 11 (2011). 
12 Id, 12. 
13 M. Sasson, Substantive Law in Investment Treaty Arbitration: The Unsettled Relationship between International 
Law and Municipal Law (Wolters Kluwer 2010). 
14 Tribunals’ interpretation of the indirect expropriation standard is also relevant; the paper on which this note is 
based, however, focuses on the FET obligation and its role as a tool for creating new property rights. 
15 These determinations are often in connection with tribunals’ decisions on indirect expropriation and non-
discrimination.  
16 See, e.g., L. Johnson, et al., “Costs and Benefits of Investment Treaties: Practical Considerations for States” 
(CCSI Policy Paper, March 2018) 12; see also L. Johnson, L. Sachs and N. Lobel, “Aligning International 
Investment Agreements with the Sustainable Development Goals,” forthcoming 2019. 
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Compounding these issues, IIAs expressly only seek to protect the rights and interests of MNEs 
and their owners, with no meaningful opportunity for those who may be adversely impacted by 
MNEs’ claims to protect themselves. IIA provisions, as interpreted and applied in ISDS, limit the 
ability of governments to legislate, regulate, or adjudicate in ways that frustrate MNEs’ economic 
rights and interests; consequently, IIAs and ISDS diminish the competing rights and claims of 
other stakeholders, undermining efforts to reduce inequality.  
 
These protections can also worsen inequality by entrenching the status quo in the face of reforms 
to promote greater equity. For instance, the general rule adopted by tribunals is that the doctrine 
of “legitimate expectations,” interpreted as being part of the FET obligation, protects expectations 
held at the time the investment is made, including that the legal framework governing or affecting 
an MNE will not change over time (or will not change much) 17
 
through court decisions, 
administrative actions, shifts in policies or practices, changes in legislation or other means of legal 
evolution.  
 
If subsequent government conduct exceeds the MNE’s “legitimate expectations,” granting more 
favorable treatment than the MNE had anticipated at the time of the investment, then the MNE 
keeps those gains; but if the government frustrates the investor’s expectations, the government 
may be ordered to compensate them for any difference between their hoped-for and actual 
economic position.  
 
One likely effect will be that, over time, the legal and policy framework will become increasingly 
favorable to MNEs. Because IIAs typically only permit investors to initiate claims against states 
(neither states nor other individuals or entities may initiate IIA claims against MNEs), the 
outcomes of ISDS decisions will generally only be to (1) uphold the property rights of MNEs as 
they existed under the host state’s domestic law, or (2) expand the property rights protections 
enjoyed by MNEs under that law. ISDS proceedings will never narrow the property rights enjoyed 
by covered MNEs under host state law. Thus, beyond the specific effects that protection of 
investors’ rights and expectations has in a particular case, the structure of the ISDS system is such 
that, over time, it will lead to a general expansion of the legal protections for MNEs’ economic 
interests, and corresponding expansion of state (taxpayer) liability for conduct interfering with 
those interests.  
 
This effect of protecting the status quo against change that negatively impacts MNEs can also 
entrench or increase inequality among firms by safeguarding the power of market incumbents as 
compared to new players. If, for example, a government decides to remove or decrease subsidies 
given to existing businesses (e.g., coal-fired power plants), and/or increase subsidies given to 
potential new competitors (e.g., generators of renewable energy), that may trigger an ISDS claim 
by the incumbents. Similarly, if the government passes new environmental or other obligations 
that would impose new costs on firms, it may proactively exempt incumbents from having to 
comply so as not to trigger a dispute, thereby favoring incumbents relative to newcomers.  
 
In addition to disadvantaging those competitors without access to ISDS, the ability of MNEs to 
entrench favorable aspects of the status quo harms other interests that would benefit from 
																																																						
17 See, e.g., Tecnicas Medioambientales Tecmed S.A. v. Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, Award, May 29, 
2003, para. 154. 
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adjustments to law and policy. Notably, MNEs have used ISDS to challenge government efforts 
to combat three of the most inequality-inducing effects that can arise from property rights 
systems—negative externalities, abusive practices of monopoly rights holders, and undue 
appropriation of gains. Investors have used ISDS to, for example, secure compensation for 
environmental laws and decisions that seek to minimize or avoid environmental externalities;18
 
regulate tariffs or tackle anti-competitive pricing in provision of public services; 19
 
or limit 
intellectual property rights, and assess “windfall profits taxes” seeking to capture a greater share 
of gains derived from the rising price of natural resources (i.e., gains not derived from the 
investor’s increased efficiency or skill).20
 
These types of decisions, which are based on a relatively 
singular focus on MNEs’ economic rights and expectations, do not take into account the broader 




As described above, IIAs provide MNEs privileged access to procedural remedies and strong 
substantive protections that favor MNEs’ property rights and expectations, creating and 
exacerbating inequality among a diverse group of other stakeholders. Furthermore, they allow 
MNEs to entrench the status quo, favoring incumbents and MNEs’ interests more generally. A 
number of known ISDS cases illustrates each of these practices and effects, but the extent of the 
trends has not been well-researched, in part because of the confidentiality of MNE-government 
interactions and in part of because of the challenge of isolating government motivations.  
 
While further research could dig deeper on the effects of existing international investment 
governance on inequality, scholars should also explore whether and how IIAs could be enlisted as 
a tool to combat intra-national inequality. As the system of international economic governance 
expands, and as intra-national inequality increases, it is crucial to understand the links between the 
two phenomena and how law can be used to advance, and not undermine, equality.  
																																																						
18 See, e.g., Bilcon v. Canada, PCA Case No. 2009-04, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, March 17, 2015.  
19 See, e.g., EDF v. Hungary, UNCITRAL, Award, December 4, 2014; Teco v. Guatemala, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/23, Award, December 19, 2013.  
20 See, e.g., Murphy Exploration and Production Co. v. Ecuador, Permanent Court of Arbitration, Award, February 
10, 2017; Perenco v. Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/6, Decision on Remaining Issues of Jurisdiction and 
Liability, June 30, 2011.  
